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1. INtroDuctIoN
Since it became a discipline in 2002 (Safire, 2002), neuroethics has 
been characterised in two ways: “ethics of neuroscience” or “neuroscience 
of ethics” (Roskies, 2002: 21-22; Cortina, 2010: 131-133; 2011: 44). The 
former refers to the nature of the ethics applied to review the ethical 
practices that imply clinically treating the human brain. The latter ‒neu-
roscience of ethics‒ implies research into more transcendental philo-
sophical notions of the human being ‒free will, personal identity, inten-
tion and control, emotion and reason relations‒ but from the brain 
functions viewpoint.
For some researchers, studying the brain by neurosciences allows us 
to talk about “neuroculture” (Mora, 2007; Frazzeto and Anker, 2009), 
which may help solve questions such as free will, desicion making, and 
even responsibility, among other elements inherent to human moral. 
Others, however, look at it from a more prudent viewpoint, and have 
indicated today’s challenges that neurosciences find with social sciences 
–especially ethics, economy, education and politics– in an attempt to 
achieve true interdisciplinary dialogue (Cortina, 2012; Salles, 2013).
In line with this interdisciplinary dialogue tradition in neurosciences, 
the present work presents a brief review of the challenges that the ad-
vances made in the neuroethics field pose to free will. As part of this review, 
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we centre specifically on the critics of the reductionism neuroscience 
tradition, which basically takes B. Libet’s experiments as a basis to deny 
human free will.
The deterministic reductionism that these positions contemplate denies 
interdisciplinary dialogue with philosophy. So it is necessary to seek 
another perspective to re-interpret Libet’s experiments that does not nul-
lify human freedom and allows an understanding with moral philosophy. 
Perhaps a stance of emergentism can allow Libet’s proposals to be re-
analysed, but beyond the reductionism tradition in which he has been 
conventionally placed. Thus our aim is to critically analyse the mistaken 
justifications that have led many neuroscientists to use Libet’s experiments 
from a deterministic perspective to deny human freedom. This objective 
is carried out in several sections.
The first part presents the three main arguments that have been used 
to deny free will based on Libet’s experiments. We particularly focus 
on the third one, which acknowledges that we are not free because our 
acts do not commence consciously. This work also offers certain 
counter-arguments which, when taken from philosophy, have been put 
forward about Libet’s experiments and its subsequent deterministic 
interpretations.
The second part comprises two sections. In the first one, a new vision 
of these experiments based on emergentism is proposed. This is done by 
assessing non-conscious conditionings during the process of doing an act. 
In the second section, conscious veto is analysed as one of the key elements 
in Libet’s experiments to defend that free will actually exists in human 
beings.
2. NeuroscIeNtIfIc DeNIals of free WIll
The empirical methodology of Libet’s experiments (Libet 1999; Libet 
et al., 1983; Libet et al., 2004), and the theoretical bases that he used to 
study the neural correlates of voluntary action, have been broadly discussed 
in recent years in the neuroscientific field (Pockett & Purdy, 2010; Rosk-
ies, 2010a; Mecacci & Haselager, 2015). From the philosophical view-
point, Libet’s experiments have very little to say about human free will, 
especially when moral philosophy has been generally understood as a 
basic condition for acting responsibly, and for wondering about the rea-
sons behind our actions.
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However, was it Libet’s intention to actually demonstrate that free 
will does not exist, or to show that voluntary action begins before the 
conscious experience of the act itself, as indicated by some? (Gracia, 2013: 
576; Schlegel et al., 2013; Mecacci & Haselager, 2015: 328). It is interest-
ing to note that his experiments do not mention “choice”, but mainly 
the “intention to act”.
Some have answered the first of the above two questions with the first 
option. That is, a neuroscientific line exists which, through deterministic 
and reductionist discourse, has been based on these experiments to point 
out that human free will does not exist. Some such authors, e.g. P. Van 
Inwagen (1989), D. Wegner (2002), F. Rubia (2009) or M. Gazzaniga 
(2011), and others who have done more recent reconstructions of Libet’s 
experiment (Soon et al., 2008), tend to offer three arguments for this:
a) Free will is a brain construction.
b) Free will is causally determined.
c) Free will begins unconsciously in our brain.
Regarding the first line of argument (a), some authors have de-
fended the free will consideration as a brain construction (Churchland, 
2002; Pinker, 1997). They agree that it is fiction that works and, 
therefore, it is necessarily socially-based fiction. And it works precisely 
because believing in free will allows people to think that we are respon-
sible for our acts. Free will is a fictitious construction that allows us to 
create a social, moral and legal system, known as “willusionism” (Nah-
mias, 2011).
For some this hypothesis is insufficient from the neuroscientific view-
point because, in order to achieve it, it is necessary to refer only to aspects 
of the human mind that reduce it to electrochemical brain functions 
(Lavazza & De Caro, 2010: 24-25). For others this hypothesis is not 
sufficient from the philosophical and social viewpoint because accepting 
fiction as the basis of structures such as moral, justice or social relations 
would not make any sense at all (Evers, 2010: 78).
With the second argument (b), some authors deny human free will 
because it is determined by our brain; in other words, by physiological 
structures – which has been termed as neurodeterminism. According to 
M. Gazzaniga, this is because the brain’s conscious experience is experi-
ence that actually occurs after the fact, where the left hemisphere acts as 
the interpreter (Gazzaniga, 2011: 105-111). Even though brain determin-
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ism can be understood from various perspectives (Baertschi & Mauron, 
2011: 152), the fact that something is determined does not mean it is 
completely determined. So as we will see later, perhaps it would be better 
to talk about “conditioned” and not about “determined”.
Neuroethics naturally relies on the study of cerebral bases, but these 
bases actually comprising foundations is quite a different matter. This 
difference has already been expressed by A. Cortina (2011: 94-96), whose 
notion was based on, among other aspects, the difference made by Span-
ish philosopher J. L. Aranguren between “moral as a structure” and 
“moral as content” (Aranguren, 1997: 58-66). Indeed neurosciences can 
study the human brain and contribute the bases or capacities that we, as 
human beings, have for actually behaving or develop our behaviour. But 
these bases or capacities cannot provide the foundations or content with 
which we fill them.
Argument three (c) is one of the basic themes of the present study. 
Some neuroscientists have argued that we are not free, not only because 
our actions are determined, but also because our behaviour is not caused 
consciously when an act begins. At this stage, we can point out that the 
most important relation is that between conscience and freedom.
Libet’s experiments are widely known (Libet 1999; Libet et al. 1983), 
and here, therefore, we only need to recall his hypothesis. Libet believed 
that the awareness of a voluntary act was subsequent to the setting in 
motion of that action. Does awareness nevertheless play an important 
role in decision making? Is it an important or a determinant role? Before 
answering these questions, it may perhaps be interesting to ask when we 
began to consider the operativity of the unconscious human brain and its 
influence on decision making.
It was Hermann von Helmholtz who, at the end of the nineteenth 
century, established a true Copernican paradigm shift with regard to 
conscious awareness. The most common belief during that period was 
that consciousness was needed for moral judgment, so that it was very 
difficult to accept the “unconscious inference” suggested by Helmholtz 
(Evers, 2010: 97). However, the idea of an active unconscious did not 
disappear but instead, as many people know, was developed more exten-
sively by Sigmund Freud, who broadened the framework of perception 
from which Helmholtz believed to operate uniquely. This idea continued 
to evolve until neuroscientists Hans Helmut Kornhuber and Lüder Deecke 
discovered, in 1965, an unconscious readiness potential to carry out an 
act. They called this Bereitschaftspotential (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965), 
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which Libet later translated as readiness potential. This unconscious 
readiness potential showed that the conscious manifestation of a voli-
tional act was unnecessary.
In 1977 during one of the first truly neurophilosophical dialogues, 
neuroscientist J. C. Eccles and philosopher K. Popper published a joint 
work entitled: The Self and its Brain: an argument for interactionism. 
This work defined their theory as dualist-interactionist (Popper & Eccles, 
1977: 355). Libet was a disciple of Eccles, and therefore contributed to 
this dialogue somewhere between philosophy and neuroscience, which 
acknowledged mind-brain dualism and its emerging relation of the pro-
cesses of the former on the physiological bases of the latter. However for 
Eccles, an act begins at the same time as the conscience of this act; in 
other words, the self-conscious mind, which comes over in his general 
theory of the mind-brain interaction (Eccles, 1994). This suggests that 
Libet’s experiments intended to demonstrate that Eccles’ theory was in-
correct rather than focusing on denying free will (Gracia, 2013: 577). 
Some have acknowledged that Libet’s real objective was to demonstrate 
that human will is free (Cortina, 2013: 18).
Our brief historic review allows us to perceive that the neuroscien-
tific and philosophical background that led to Libet’s experiments was 
dualist, and not non-monist, deterministic (Gracia, 2013: 558; Murillo 
& Giménez-Amaya, 2008). This, therefore, opens up a way to recon-
sider the original emergentist interpretation noted in Libet’s experiments. 
However, others have viewed them differently, and have attempted to 
neuroscientifically colonise the philosophy field. Authors like Wegner, 
Dennet or Rubia have taken empiricist and neuroscientific monism, and 
believe they have found the bases of what philosophy has always addressed, 
human freedom. Their solution has unified mainly body-mind dualism.
For instance, when referring to Libet’s experiments, Wegner warned 
that given the time distance between RP and the appearance of conscience, 
we have no control over our decisions. If we are not conscious of a deci-
sion at the precise time we make it, we do not completely control it. 
Actions begin because of our desires and beliefs but, consequently, we do 
this passively. Nonetheless, admitting that we are conscious requires active 
causal (not passive) activation through our desires and beliefs. So for 
Wegner, we are actually free if, and only if, we have active power to in-
tervene in making our decision from the precise time at which our desires 
and beliefs begin to the very last microsecond before acting (Wegner, 
2004: 650; Levy, 2007: 232-234).
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In line with this argument, we may wonder from the neurobiological 
(and even educational) perspective whether human beings having an active 
causal influence as a result of their acts through desires and beliefs are 
actually of any interest. Personally, I consider that this would reduce our 
free will frame, and we would also take longer to perform action from 
the instant RP appears. If each time we make a decision or perform some 
action, the influence of our desires and beliefs would be active and not 
passive, the time between RP and the action would be longer.
The hypothesis about the conscious influence on mental mechanisms 
for them to become unconscious with time, and thus become habits, is a 
basic premise for any educational and therapeutic programme (Evers, 
2010: 100). Indeed it is precisely the development of habits that enables 
vital energy to be saved and which shapes our character and its various 
dimensions and is, therefore, also a basic premise of ethics (Cortina, 2013: 
36-42).
At this point we wonder about two things at least. First, why and how 
have Libet’s reductionist interpretations been made that they deny human 
free will? Second, how can a re-interpretation be made which, if we bear 
in mind the neuroscientific dimension of the experiments, would not 
deny human freedom?
In an attempt to answer the first question, philosopher J. Habermas 
seems to recognise certain interpretation errors which may have led to 
this situation.
J. Habermas’ position is philosophical and discursive, and begins with 
smooth non-scientific naturalism (Habermas, 2006: 161). In this way, 
Habermas considers that all that can be expressed as true statements is 
real. Yet this does not mean that all scientific statements made from ex-
perience exhaust reality. J. Habermas also expresses the idea that the heavy 
deterministic weight of B. Libet’s experiments is not due to the author 
himself, but to subsequent attributions (Habermas, 2006: 162). If we bear 
in mind these considerations, the five criteria made by Habermas about 
Libet’s experiments and its interpretations stand out:
1) Attribution error.
2) Epistemological error.
3) Methodological error.
4) Ontological error (or from ontological monism).
5) Discursive (or linguistic) error.
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The attribution error (1) consists in, when it comes to justifying the 
denial of freedom, neuroscience having attributed the basic “self” role 
(psychological) to the brain (neurobiological) (Habermas, 2006: 160).
The epistemological error (2) refers to determinism of laws of nature. 
According to Habermas, determinism would not be a theory based on 
laws of nature alone, but rather a naturalist cosmovision based on a 
speculative interpretation of a series of typical knowledge about laws of 
nature (Habermas, 2006: 160), which would ultimately fall within epi-
phenomenalism.
The methodological error (3) refers to Libet’s own experiment. Apart 
from the artificial creation of abstract situations of decisions being some-
what questionable, we ought not to forget that the participants were 
taught about the process of the experiment itself. So they would prefer-
entially concentrate on planning action rather than on performing it –
which was what was requested in the end– (Habermas, 2006: 162).
The ontological error (4), or ontological monism, would consist in a 
deterministic current posterior to Libet’s experiments having unified 
causes and reasons to act as a single element. Such monism totally invali-
dates the subject’s capacity to indict because if the decision process is 
naturalised by a single cause explanation, the agent would become de-
moted, which would thus eliminate his/her initiative (Habermas, 2006: 
165, 167).
The linguistic error (5) would imply unifying, and thus confusing, 
two vocabularies that explain reality: one refers to observable causes, and 
the other to rational motives (Habermas, 2006: 173). For the purpose 
of adapting our species to a natural and social setting, human beings would 
impose two types of explanatory perspectives to the world, and would 
express them by the two above-mentioned vocabularies. One reduction-
ist explanation based only on physiological “observable” conditionings 
would imply denying freedom, as we could only observe it, but not 
participate in it. For Habermas, the human being is not only an ob-
server of natural reality, but is also an active participant of social reality, 
which it shares intersubjectively with other subjects. Neuroscientific re-
ductionism would only help us as observers, but not as participants in 
this reality (Habermas, 2006: 176). Only the link of these two perspectives 
enables social cognition and moral conscience to develop. The active 
participant perspective that is discovered at the intersubjectivity level, 
which reciprocally recognises subjects as valid interlocutors, is that which 
brings the freedom experience to light (Cortina, 2013: 26).
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Some conclusions may be drawn from what we have seen so far. 
Firstly, Libet intended to further demonstrate the influence of the non-
conscious mechanisms of an action to refute J. Eccles’ thesis. Secondly, 
denying human freedom by taking Libet’s experiments as an example is 
based on interpretation errors. Thus in order to answer the second ques-
tion above, and in order to make the re-interpretation that takes into 
account the neuroscientific position in studying free will, but does not 
nullify it, two things at least are required: one, assessing the weight of 
these non-conscious conditioning factors when determining whether 
freedom exists or not; two, assessing the weight of consciously interrupt-
ing the act (what Libet termed conscious veto). It should not be assessed 
in a reductionist fashion, but conversely, the emergentist position should 
be retaken.
3.  a PhIlosoPhIcal re-INterPretatIoN of lIBet’s 
exPerIMeNt
3.1.  ASSESSING NON-CONSCIOUS INFLUENCES IN DECISION 
MAkING
Libet’s point of departure is that there is electrical activity before the 
acts that we consider voluntary, which he calls readiness potential (RP). 
The principal question that this neuroscientist asked was not about the 
free act but instead about the voluntary act. Furthermore, the question 
“Do we have free will?” that leads to Libet’s 1999 article does not ask 
whether we have absolute liberty –freedom– but instead whether we have 
freedom of action – free will. The fact that Libet questions whether we 
have free will and not whether we have freedom means two things. First, 
Libet is not asking whether we as human beings possess absolute freedom 
but instead about our ability to select among certain possibilities at a 
particular moment, given that there is a certain conditioning. Second, 
Libet is aware that will and freedom are not always identified with each 
other; that is, that a voluntary act may not be a free act. That is to say 
free will is a condition for a voluntary act, but it does not shape it totally 
former part (Libet et al., 2004: 56; Gracia, 2013: 563; Evers, 2010: 100).
This is not new as the influence of non-conscious elements on decision 
making is a long-standing philosophical tradition. In his Book III, Nico-
machean Ethics, Aristotle proposed a philosophical outline for choice in 
Ramon Llull Journal_07.indd   128 09/05/16   14:09
129PallarÉs
My BraIN MaDe Me nOT DO IT: aN eMerGeNtIst INterPretatIoN 
of BeNJaMIN lIBet
which choice must not be confused with will. This is because will is ap-
petitive and desiderative, but requires reflecting on the reason to become 
a choice. Choosing is neither desiring nor wanting. For Aristotle, good 
is desired and we can desire anything, but we can choose only what is 
within our reach (Aristotle, 2011: 42-43).
Following this line, in Aristotelian thought reinterpreted through 
Tomás de Aquino, the intellectivus appetitus has two parts, one appetitive 
and other one rational. Free will would affect only the rational part, 
distinguishing about different appetites and taking action. There are ap-
petites that come to us helplessly, but behind them, we can choose. 
Therefore, the moment that free will appears is not at the beginning of 
the process of carrying out an action, but later, over the intellectual vo-
litional appetite (Tomas de Aquino, 1964).
This observation seems to be congruent with the neuroscientific ex-
planation. Because consciousness has its seat in the cerebral cortex, there 
are some functions –especially perceptive functions– that are initiated in 
the nervous system (NS) but are somewhat delayed in arriving at the 
cortex, thus giving rise to a small delay between what happens and what 
is perceived. Libet also argues that there should have been some difference 
between the beginning of brain activity to carry out a voluntary action 
and the time of the conscious intention to do so (Libet et al. 2004: 125).
Thus, what Libet wanted to show was that the voluntary act begins 
before it is consciously experienced. To do so, he needed a measure of 
the two most important phenomena of this process: readiness potential 
(RP) and conscious experience. Given that the consciousness of the inten-
tion to act (W) did not coincide with the beginning of the RP but instead 
occurs 350-400 ms later, Libet concludes that there is an intention to act 
prior to the awareness of the intention to act.
The initiation of the freely voluntary act appears to begin in the brain 
unconsciously, well before the person consciously knows he wants to act! Is 
there any role for conscious will in the performance of a voluntary act? (…) 
To answer this it must be recognised the conscious will (W) does appear about 
150 msec before the muscle is activated, even though it follows onset of the RP 
(Libet 1999: 51).
However, his explanation does not stop here, which would lead to a 
deterministic point of view of negation of freedom. In fact, Libet over-
comes this determinism, adding, “An interval of 150 msec would allow 
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enough time in which the conscious function might affect the final out-
come of the volitional process” (Libet, 1999: 51).
From these words, one can gather that Libet does not close the door 
to conscious voluntary control, which in the final analysis governs the 
action. Thus, as has been noted above, intention precedes the awareness 
of intention. However, this point has resulted in some authors arriving 
at an erroneous conclusion (in my view). It has been argued that because 
a free act must necessarily be conscious, free will does not exist: before 
we are aware of our intention to act, the decision has already been 
made.
In fact, this conclusion is a fallacy, principally for two reasons. First, 
according to Libet, what could be concluded from this would be only 
functional, not causal relationships, or else we would fall, as Gracia indi-
cates, into a fallacy of the type post hoc ergo propter hoc (Gracia, 2013: 
568). Second, one must note that Libet speaks of “intent to act”, not of 
“choice”, which are two very different things: «Human subjects became 
aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts» (Libet, 1999: 47). 
It is thus necessary, having gotten to this point, to clarify the distinction 
between intention and choice. Here we present the second of the episte-
mological errors in this debate.
The term “intention” comes from the Latin intendere or tendere in, 
that is, a tendency to carry out something. Tendencies are what often 
give rise to a process of choice. Of course, voluntary intentions may exist, 
but this is not always the case. Only when the intentio is rational can we 
speak of voluntary intention. In other words, voluntariness is a charac-
teristic of intention, but an intention is not always voluntary (Gracia, 
2013: 569). Intention constitutes the condition of the possibility of choice.
Voluntary intention that may lead to choice can enable making a free 
choice from among several possibilities, but not absolutely.
Does this mean that humans do not possess free will? Or that free will 
is not a transcendent human condition? Of course not. Looking at Libet’s 
thought from an emergentist standpoint, awareness or the W moment is 
not something new; instead, it emerges through the conjunction of the 
prior factors in the RP process and thus becomes a basic characteristic for 
the subject to decide freely.
In this way, free will does indeed exist. But what will these previous 
factors be? Possibilities of action offered to intelligence at all times. This 
is how some Spanish philosophers like X. Zubiri, and later D. Gracia, 
have understood it.
Ramon Llull Journal_07.indd   130 09/05/16   14:09
131PallarÉs
My BraIN MaDe Me nOT DO IT: aN eMerGeNtIst INterPretatIoN 
of BeNJaMIN lIBet
Zubiri’s study also approaches the relation between brain activity and 
optional activity in an emerging sense. For this Spanish philosopher, 
impulses are non-specific, unfinished, in nature; that is, they are open to 
take care of reality (Zubiri, 1986: 533). For human beings to take care 
of reality, they have to choose, and there in the exercise of choosing lies 
their wilful nature. Intelligence appears by emerging from the biological 
structures of human beings, and the brain is the organ that performs this 
formalising task as hyperformalisation (Conill, 2015: 269).
As the first instant of a free act, impulses make up that through which 
the human being “is taken”, which Zubiri names «ferences» (ferencias) 
(Zubiri, 1986: 533). Unlike what many neuroscientists have concluded 
from B. Libet’s experiments, these ferences do not completely determine 
the act being finally achieved. Regarding these ferences, when selecting, 
human beings transform them into pre-ferences (pre-ferencias) because 
they decide which of them they face to take care of reality. In Zubiri’s 
opinion, an option has three instants: act, determination and incorpora-
tion. Yet these instants cannot be inferred in Libet’s experiment as subjects 
do not have enough real time to shift from ferences to preferences.
Our brain’s non-specific neurofunctional activity is what makes us 
choose, but not to choose among infinitely possible entities, but accord-
ing to the ferences in a given situation. So it is not a matter of neurofunc-
tional activity acting intrinsically and exposing us to various extrinsic 
possibilites –we would be quite unable to prefer anything without brain 
activity– but it makes us choose between a specific and limited setting of 
ferences intrinsically (Zubiri, 1986: 534).
According to Zubiri, we note that brain activity establishes the op-
tativity process. Yet the option process also determines the course of 
brain activity. So is it a twin process? Does this mean that force of will 
is applied to my brain, which makes me move a finger as in B. Libet’s 
experiment? The answer is no in both cases. Indeed it is a single psycho-
organic process. As opposed to Libet’s reductionist interpretations, 
Zubiri believes that volition (willfulness) is a psycho-organic act that 
takes care of option, and thus covers the entire volitive-neuronal process 
(Zubiri, 1986: 536-537).
Yet what happens once a ference becomes a pre-ference? Would it be 
a matter of adding possibilities to accomplish an act? Not according to 
Zubiri. As we prefer certain possibilities to others, we face them to take 
care of reality. When we take care of reality, we use the properties that 
define one possibility, or several possibilities, of “being”. Such usage is 
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integration, which is the purpose of a process: superior free human activ-
ity, which thus shapes human beings’ substantiveness (Zubiri, 1986: 541).
Regarding J. Habermas’ former criticism, and despite their different 
philosophical traditions, Habermas shares the human substantiveness 
thesis with Zubiri as an emerging single psycho-organic process that is 
arranged into two instants. For Habermas, the physiological component 
(the body) would be inherent to the subject him/herself and to decision 
making. As actional subjects or agents, human beings are identified with 
their body, which empowers and enables them to undertake action. While 
exercising their free will, only organic determination could never occur 
(since this is not an external element). Free will possesses natural condi-
tioning factors, but it is also conditioned by reasons that pertain to the 
agent’s subjective nature (Habermas, 2006: 168).
The line followed by D. Gracia is similar to that of Zubiri, especially 
in terms of the emergentist vision of Libet’s experiments. Here we un-
derstand emergentism as the line taken by K. Popper and J. Eccles (1977), 
that is, all emerging processes maintain irreducibility and unpredictabil-
ity characteristics, as well as the capacity to create new systemic properties 
(Stephan, 1992: 25-48). This is because the important point of emergent-
ism is that it affirms the appearance of new systematic properties which, 
in human beings, are transcendental properties as they transcend to the 
“environment” typical of any animal species until it becomes a world 
(Gracia, 2013: 557).
By following an emergentist interpretation, the so-called “conscious 
mental state” is an emerging property of the physical brain, which is 
unyielding to purely neuronal processes, but is still related to them (Libet 
et al., 2004: 170). The “conscious mental state” is not only an emerging 
property, but conscious veto also is. As previously mentioned, a truly 
interdisciplinary re-interpretation of Libet’s experiments (neuroscientific 
and philosophical) implies assessing conscious veto during decision-
making processes.
3.2. ASSESSING CONSCIOUS vETO DURING DECISION MAkING
According to Libet, it could be the case that if there is awareness and 
ability for control of an action, the resulting act is marked by two paths: 
the achievement of the act or, instead, the annulment of the action. In 
any event, there is volitional control over the action (conscious and vol-
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untary), that is, there exists the ability to choose. Clearly, here we discard 
psychopathological disorders in which the subject believes that he or she 
has control over his or her response, when in reality, that is not the case 
(Libet, 1999: 49). Indeed, Libet talked about the conscious veto in the 
following terms:
Potentially available to the conscious function is the possibility of stopping 
or vetoing the final progress of the volitional process, so that no actual muscle 
action ensues. Conscious-will could thus affect the outcome of the volitional 
process even though the latter was initiated by unconscious cerebral process. 
Conscious-will might block or veto the process, so that no act occurs (Libet, 
1999: 51-52).
The possibilities of action that Libet offers in his experiment are quite 
limited. The entire actional field can boil down to moving one’s wrist, 
so both possibilities of action consist in accepting or denying this action. 
Such studied actions are expressed actions –overt actions– (Mele, 2013: 
2) and, according to Libet, they are neutrally moral. So, what reasons are 
there for preferring to move one’s wrist or for pressing a button on a 
timer?:
They decided when to flex a wrist, when to press a key, or which of two 
buttons to press. In none of these studies was there any reason to prefer the 
decided upon options to similar alternative options – and vice versa (Mele, 
2013: 5).
Evidently, finger movement can be used to activate a nuclear weapon 
or to fire a pistol, but this is not the case. Nonetheless, it is true that Libet 
made it quite clear that moral-type actions were beyond his experiment 
(Libet et al., 2004: 155; 1999: 47), or at least that is what he believed in 
principle.
It is true that free conscious and voluntary will exists but, in this case, 
the choice of moving one’s wrist is not temporarily restricted to the time the 
experiment is done, but it is implicit when the subject takes part in 
the experiment. It has been previously stated that a decision has nothing 
to do with the moral level because, in this sense, it is trivial. Yet if we 
leave these details to one side, and accept that the experiment is actually 
about the act now dimension (Libet, 1999: 54), what is interesting about 
conscious veto is choice linked to the deliberation process.
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One might think that the ability to veto implies a new voluntary act 
and thus a new RP process, so that it would not be possible to develop it 
in the 150 ms that the author gives for the veto (Libet et al. 2004: 147). 
However, if we continue to maintain Libet’s emergentist perspective, we 
note that the veto is not another act distinct from the act already initi-
ated; instead, it is the same act, with the veto being an emergent capacity 
of the conscious process that begins at W. Thus, the veto is inherent to 
every conscious human act; it is a part of it and consequently cannot be 
viewed as a new act (Libet 1999: 573).
However, how can Libet say that he is not referring in his experiment 
to ethical questions that require much more deliberation (Libet et al. 
2004: 155; Libet 1999: 47) while giving an example of the veto situations 
in which the subject refrains from carrying out an action that is unethical 
and socially unacceptable?
All of us, not just experimental subjects, have experienced our vetoing a 
spontaneous urge to perform some act. This often occurs when the urge to act 
involves some socially unacceptable consequence, like an urge to shout some 
obscenity at the professor (Libet, 1999: 52).
As can be inferred from these words, Libet does not consider pro-
cesses of moral or social action in his experiments–here, the focus is on 
the “act now”. Although Libet does consider these deliberative processes 
for explaining the conscious veto, he also explains that the veto has no 
unconscious origin. According to Libet, the conscious veto does not re-
quire an unconscious process that precedes it because the veto is a control 
function, which is something very different from being aware of acting 
(Libet, 1999: 52-53).
Thus, Libet leaves aside the contemplation or study of deliberation in 
his experiment; however, he does consider it in attempting to explain the 
veto. Is this a contradiction? The neuroscientist considers that deliberation 
is a process separate from that which he is studying, which in the final 
analysis would take place prior to the RP (Libet et al. 2004: 135; Levy, 
2007: 54). However, from the emergentist perspective that we are using 
to study Libet, one could consider that deliberation begins before the RP 
but is not for that reason a separate process.
It is necessary to differentiate between “deliberation” (which is always 
conscious) and “conscious intention”. Hence although conscience of in-
tention always appears slightly after decision making starts, this is no 
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obstacle for free will (Shariff & Peterson, 2005: 205; Mele, 2013: 8; 
Roskies, 2010b).
Conscious veto is one of the best examples to observe voluntary con-
scious action. It also offers another great advantage: its vast importance 
in moral terms. This confers the conscious free will concept further sig-
nificance. As the author explains: «The role of conscious free will be, 
then, not to initiate a voluntary act, but rather to control whether the 
act takes place» (Libet, 1999: 54). In this way, although our appetites 
unconsciously take over our mind, the main ethical point is whether we 
eventually accomplish them or not as an act. Given the importance of 
conscious veto as the ultimate barrier before accomplishing an act, this 
element becomes the frontier mechanism between the action thought and 
the experienced action. So morally, it becomes very important.
Some authors have even investigated if such conscious veto responds 
to a specific cortex area.
Studies by P. Haggard (2011), and P. Haggard and M. Heimer (1999) 
have shown that in experiments on conscious decision and inhibited 
conscious intention that use the potential of related events and func-
tional magnetic resonance images, there is an activation of the prefrontal 
cortex in trials with inhibition that is not present in trials of conscious 
decision. Furthermore, there is a resulting activation of the insula, which 
is interpreted as being caused by the experience of frustration that ac-
companies moments of failure in the execution of a programmed action.
These same authors acknowledge the possibility that the brain con-
tains a specific zone that manages control to consciously brake the 
unconscious impulse. For Brass and Haggard, a particular area of the 
dorsal mediofrontal cortex (dMFC) is associated with a type of self-
control and also shows connectivity with areas of motor preparation. 
This could suggest that self-control, and in the final analysis Libet’s 
conscious veto, is achieved through the modulation of areas of the brain 
that participate in motor preparation (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Kuhn 
et al., 2009; Sigiru et al. 2003).
Despite the possibility of there being a specific brain area dedicated 
to conscious veto or not, what the attempts made to date have attempt-
ed to explain is that the human being does not possess absolute freedom, 
but is conditioned by the typical circumstantial possibilities of action. 
Therefore, free will consists in choosing one of the possibilities offered 
to us, and this possibility is determined by the subject’s preferences, 
feelings and appraisals, but not completely. Moreover, choosing a pos-
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sibility of action implies not making other possible choices; in other 
words, we can rule them out and/or veto them to make a more suitable 
decision and to act accordingly.
Indeed, when the supply of action is broad, as it is in moral decisions 
–although it does not take place in this way in Libet’s experiments– a 
process of deliberation is needed that, in accordance with our argument, 
begins before the RP. The result that this deliberation produces –before 
the act– is a veto of directly accepting any possibility offered that is in-
consistent with our moral evaluation (Gracia, 2013: 577).
Consequently, the result of the moral action, taking into account 
Libet’s experiments, does not refer so much to the first decision made 
after a deliberation process –a positive formulation– but instead to the 
final decision considered after discarding others that would not fit with 
our moral thinking from neural parameters – a negative formulation. 
This interpretation largely agrees with the line of thinking in the His-
panic tradition from which we started. The adjustment to circumstanc-
es of which Ortega y Gasset spoke, and which was taken up by Zubiri 
and Aranguren, among others, largely agrees with this reinterpretation 
of Libet’s experiments. However, given an understanding of Libet’s 
experiments from an emergentist position, as proposed here, it seems to 
be the case that the human brain understands free will less as the ability 
to select one action among those available at a particular moment than 
as the ability to choose not to perform some actions in favor of others 
that favor us and/or others. Volitional control and the possibility of 
cancelling an action induced by unconscious experience seem to be ele-
ments that, according to the experiments studied, assume great impor-
tance in human decision making. Furthermore, although awareness of 
intention always appears shortly after the beginning of a decision, that 
fact does not constitute an obstacle to free will (Mele 2013: 8; Shariff & 
Peterson 2005: 205).
In this sense, neuroethics can follow its own path, distancing itself 
from neural determinism and the belief that human free will is an illusion 
that is proposed by many neuroscientists. As a mediator and interdisci-
plinary science, neuroethics seems to confirm, like moral philosophy, 
that the human being possesses free will, which is not an illusion of the 
brain but instead an emergent element of our consciousness and our own 
neural nature. It is necessary, but it is not a fiction. However, free will 
seems to justify in a better way that in humans’ moral decision making, 
the important elements are the reasons not to perform one or various 
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actions–that is, control over not carrying them out–instead of the reasons 
for performing an action. It may be that the brain makes the decision 
before we have an awareness of the action to be performed, but what 
accompanies us until the attainment of an act is the ability to veto it, as 
accounted for by Libet (Libet & Haggard, 2001).
4. coNclusIoNs
Given the above, one could conclude first that human free will is a 
legal, social, moral and neural axiom that arises out of the interaction 
between mind and brain. It is therefore necessary to study mind and brain 
together, but not identifying them as a single element. Only if we con-
sider its entire actional dimension it is possible to speak of responsibility, 
intentionality and voluntariness.
Second, free will is not a fiction, it is not even a fiction that functions. 
Our own neurobiology and our cognitive development do not allow us 
to believe in fictions that function for the sake of social life. In this sense, 
free will is more an emergent result of our brain than a construction by 
it, and thus, the fact that it is determined by some of its components that 
regulate previous unconscious experiences does not mean that it is com-
pletely determined.
Third, the fact that an act is initiated in an unconscious way does not 
prove that the brain is deceiving us; this conclusion is prompted by the 
relationship between the conscious and unconscious minds in the human 
brain. It may be that, as Libet notes, intention is initiated unconsciously, 
but the attainment of an act, that is, the final word on human action, is 
conscious. Furthermore, one must consider that the influence of conscious 
processes in the unconscious mind –and vice versa– is one of the basic 
premises of any educational system.
Fourth, the adoption of an emergentist position regarding the treat-
ment and study of the human brain allows for greater interdisciplinarity 
with the social sciences, especially with ethics and education. In turn, an 
emergentist position enables us to abandon reductionist or determinist 
positions, understanding free will more as the ability to decide among 
various possibilities for action at a particular moment than as the complete 
absence of conditioning or absolute liberty.
Fifth, the reasons given by some neuroscientists for viewing Libet as 
a determinist who denies –through his experiments– that human beings 
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have free will, are insufficient. Returning to the analysis of Libet’s ex-
periments by adopting an emergentist point of view allows us to under-
stand the conscious veto not as a new element but instead as a system with 
characteristics different from the neural processes that shape it –but that 
also cannot be explained without those processes– and that intervene in 
decision making. Thus, it leaves the door open for conscious and volun-
tary control until the act is completed.
At a minimum, the consideration of the emergentist implications 
of human free will provide a way of thinking about the authority of 
the human being as an agent in decision making and action. Further-
more, the emergentist perspective could help achieve a better relation-
ship among the sciences that point to a common and interdisciplinary 
field, such as neuroethics. An understanding of emergentism in the 
human brain would certainly bring positions together because it would 
discard determinisms and reductionisms that can often cancel out 
dialogue with the social sciences (especially moral philosophy). This 
approach favors a greater approximation between moral philosophy 
and neuroscience so that they can conduct a critical and interdiscipli-
nary dialogue.
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